



Security Council

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Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to submit to the members of the Security Council the attached letter addressed to him under paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its enclosure containing a plan for the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of items specified in paragraph 12 of that resolution.

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Annex

Letter dated 16 May 1991 from the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) addressed to
the Secretary-General

Under paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), the Director General of the IAEA is requested, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to develop within forty-five days of the adoption of the resolution a plan for the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the items specified in paragraph 12 of the resolution.

May I accordingly kindly ask you to submit the attached plan to the Security Council.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

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Enclosure

Plan for the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of
the items specified in paragraph 12 of Security Council
resolution 687 (1991)

Introduction

1. Paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) inter alia requests the Director General of IAEA through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission ... to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within 45 days calling for the destruction, removing or rendering harmless of all items listed in paragraph 12 of the resolution.
2. In order to implement the actions required of the Agency pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of the resolution, the Director General of IAEA established on 15 April 1991 an action team placed under the direction of an Agency Deputy Director General and composed of a Deputy Director for Administration and Management and a Deputy Director for Operations.
3. The Agency established contact with the Special Commission set up by the Secretary-General following the approval by the Security Council on 19 April 1991 of the Secretary-General's report submitted to it in document S/22508. Assistance and cooperation is being rendered by the Special Commission and certain modalities for this cooperation have been agreed upon.

Immediate on-site inspection

4. On 18 April 1991, the Government of Iraq submitted to the Director General of IAEA a declaration required by paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). Further information was provided on 27 April 1991.
5. The first on-site inspection, based on the Iraqi declaration to IAEA and additional designations by the Special Commission, started on 15 May 1991. The inspection team on this occasion was headed by a Chief Inspector appointed by IAEA and consisted of 34 persons, including Agency officials and experts as well as representatives and other personnel of the Special Commission. The team's expertise covers all areas of nuclear technology as well as supporting specialties such as radiation protection, explosive ordnance disposal, communications and field security.

The plan

Nuclear-weapons-usable material

6. Nuclear-weapons-usable material or, as it is referred to in Agency practice, "direct-use material" a/ cannot be destroyed or rendered harmless in

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Iraq. The Agency will have to take exclusive control of this material for custody and removal from Iraq pursuant to paragraph 12. This is considered to be the foremost task to be undertaken. Known amounts of direct-use material, located in the Tuwaltha area and listed in the Iraqi statement of 27 April 1991, are contained in fresh or irradiated fuel assemblies. Part of this material appears to be stored in accessible conditions. The on-site inspection, which is now under way, is verifying declared quantities and conditions of this material. Further direct-use material, according to the Iraqi declaration, consisting of irradiated fuel assemblies for the IRT 5000 nuclear research reactor, is buried under the rubble of the reactor building. In all probability, a complex and costly decommissioning operation will be needed to render this material accessible for removal and disposal.

7. Following the preliminary on-site verification now under way of the existence of irradiated direct-use material in the damaged reactor building, it is intended to begin the early removal of easily accessible direct-use material, the decommissioning of the building and the removal of the irradiated fuel assemblies, once their accessibility is achieved.

8. In the event that any additional sites are designated by the Special Commission under paragraphs 9 (b) (ii) and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) further inspections will be carried out.

9. The Agency will take custody, through the application of Agency verification, containment and surveillance methods, of the direct-use material in Iraq. Agency safeguards will be applied to all direct-use material removed from Iraq.

10. Negotiations with countries possessing the technology for the transportation and storage of direct-use material to ascertain their willingness to receive this material are under way. Consideration is being given to various options for the long-term disposal or rendering harmless of this material.

Other items subject to paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991)

11. The declaration of Iraq listed only direct-use material and a yellow-cake production unit. Inspection of sites for other items subject to paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) that may be designated by the Special Commission will aim to determine if such items exist and, if so, to remove, destroy or render them harmless.

12. Identification of research, development, support or manufacturing facilities and materials relevant or connected to reprocessing of irradiated fuel and isotopic enrichment of uranium will be given priority as they are capable of producing additional direct-use material.

Notes

a/ Direct-use material is nuclear material that can be converted into nuclear explosives components without transmutation or further enrichment, as for instance plutonium containing less than 80 per cent plutonium-238, high-enriched uranium (HEU) (uranium enriched to 20 per cent uranium-235 or more) and uranium-233.
